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Abstract
Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition in-
creases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, in-
creasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition.
The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity if
we consider that countries compete not only in taxes but also in the provision of
infrastructure. The simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that
the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of interna-
tional capital mobility.
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1 Introduction
The trend toward increased international integration results in higher capital and labor
mobility, which, in turn, intensifies international competition for productive factors.
The competing countries can differ relative to their population size, their initial capital
endowments or their level of institutional development. Do these disparities between
the competing jurisdictions damage global social welfare? Important contributions
that address capital tax competition between asymmetric jurisdictions, such as those
of Bucovetsky (1991) or Wilson (1991), demonstrate that larger countries choose higher
tax rates than smaller countries because they face a relatively lower tax elasticity of
capital and, hence, a lower marginal cost of public funds. As a result, equilibrium
tax rates differ across states and lead to an inefficient allocation of capital (Wilson and
Wildasin, 2004; Burbidge and Cuff, 2005; Boadway and Tremblay, 2011). Particularly,
Kanbur and Keen (1993) analyze commodity tax competition when countries differ
in population size. While reasserting the general result that smaller countries charge
lower tax rates than larger countries, these authors demonstrate that increasing size
asymmetry exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition. In other words, increasing
size inequality between jurisdictions makes tax competition more harmful.
Many authors argue that jurisdictions compete strategically and independently
with respect to taxes and infrastructure expenditures (for example, Hindriks et al.,
2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2012 and Hauptmeier et al, 2012). The aim of this note
is to show that inter-jurisdictional competition with tax and non-tax instruments may
change the classical view regarding the detrimental effect of increasing country size
disparities. In particular, we demonstrate that this view has no general validity and
depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility.
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2 The model
Consider two jurisdictions symbolized by S and L that compete for foreign direct capi-
tal. Population is evenly distributed, with a unit density, over the segment [0; 1]. Coun-
try S is assumed to be small in terms of total population. Its size is given by s; and
0  s < 1=2. The size of the large country, L, equals 1
2
< 1   s  1. Similar to Pieretti
and Zanaj (2011), we assume that each individual owns one unit of capital and is, at
the same time, an entrepreneur and a worker. In other words, a one-person company
is associated with each member of the population1. While the entrepreneurs can move
their activity abroad, we assume, similar to Ogura (2006), that they are heterogeneous
in their preference to leave their current location. The entrepreneurs are thus ranked
according to their willingness to relocate abroad. The closer an individual is to the bor-
der separating countries S and L, the easier it is for the individual to relocate abroad.
In other words, an entrepreneur of type x 2 [0; 1] who moves abroad incurs a disutility
kjx  sj. Here, k > 0 is the unit cost of capital relocation, which will also be interpreted
as the degree of international openness and jx sj is the “distance" between the border
s and the entrepreneur of type x.
Firms
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we introduce a linear technology in the following
way. Each individual in country j (j = S; L) is able to produce, with one unit of capital,
yj = q + j units of one final good, where q is the output share determined by the
private sector2 and j is the fraction depending on a public investment in country j. We
assume that the final good is sold in a competitive market at a given price normalized
to one. Because firms are free to move, location choices must be considered. The capital
owners will set up their activity where profit, net of taxes and moving cost, is highest.
1It follows that the world population coincides with the population of firms. We could complicate
the model by assuming that each firm is run by more than one person, but this would unnecessarily
complicate the model without further insights.
2We assume that q is large enough such that the net income of firms and the social welfare are always
positive.
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Assume without loss of generality that the capital owner x 2 [0; s] living in country
S is indifferent toward producing at home or producing in the foreign country L if
q + S   tS = q + L   tL   k (s  x) ; (1)
where tS and tL are source-based tax rates levied on capital in countries S and L, re-
spectively.
It follows that
x =
1
k
((S   L) + (tL   tS)) + s: (2)
If x > s; firms move from the larger country to the smaller one, while firms move
from the smaller country to its larger rival if x < s:
Governments
We now assume that the jurisdictions of S and L are able to increase, by appropriate
public infrastructure expenditures, the productivity of all the firms located within their
respective territories. As in Hindriks et al. (2008) and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we
assume that one additional unit of public good produces one additional unit of private
good. Consequently, the amount of public good supplied by jurisdiction j (j = S; L)
equals j . The cost of providing this public good in country j is given by the quadratic
cost function C(j) = 12
2
j . Each jurisdiction j (j = S; L) is supposed to maximize its
total tax revenue3, net of public expenditures, by choosing the appropriate tax rate tj
and infrastructure levels j . The government’s objective functions are thus given by
BS = tSx  1
2
2S; BL = tL(1  x) 
1
2
2L; (3)
3For a similar assumption, see Kanbur and Keen (1993), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), and Pieretti
and Zanaj (2011).
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2.1 Competition in taxes and infrastructure
We now consider that the jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure expendi-
tures. To that end, we analyze a two-stage game4. First, the governments choose the
level of infrastructure non-cooperatively and then, set the tax rates. Finally, firms de-
cide where to locate their businesses. We solve the game backwards.
Starting from the second stage, each government chooses the tax rate that maxi-
mizes its objective assuming the rival’s rate is given. The first order conditions yield
the following unique equilibrium in tax rates
tS =
1
3
[k(1 + s) + S   L] ; tL = 1
3
[k(2  s) + L   S] : (4)
After having substituted the above tax rates into the jurisdictions’ objective func-
tions, we can solve for stage 1 when governments compete for infrastructure expen-
ditures S and L. Solving the first order conditions leads to the unique equilibrium
infrastructure expenditures
S =
6k(1 + s)  4
3(9k   4) ; L =
6k(2  s)  4
3(9k   4) : (5)
Introducing (5) into (4) yields the equilibrium tax rates
tS =
k[3k(1 + s)  2]
9k   4 ; tL =
k[3k(2  s)  2]
9k   4 : (6)
Imposing j > 0; tj > 0 and x 2 (0; 1) requires that k > k = 23 . It is straightforward
to see that, at equilibrium, the productivity of firms will be highest in the larger country
and the tax rate will be lowest in the smaller country. Indeed, we have L   S =
2k 1 2s
9k 4 > 0 and tL   tS = 3k2 1 2s9k 4 > 0 because 0  s < 1=2. At equilibrium, we also
show that x   s > 0 where x = 3k(1+s) 2
9k 4 . In other words, the smaller country attracts
a fraction of entrepreneurs coming from the larger jurisdiction by undercutting the
4The choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made
first.
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rival’s tax rate even if it can provide attractive infrastructure. The larger country tries
to resist the capital outflow by providing more infrastructure than its small rival.
3 Size effect on social welfare
As in Zissimos and Wooders (2008), we define efficiency as the maximum level of sur-
plus available to all individuals in the two economies
W = (S + L) + (BS +BL)  k
Z jx sj
0
ydy: (7)
The two terms in the brackets include, respectively, the joint firms’ profits5 and joint
tax revenues. The last term is the companies’ relocation costs.
We can write more explicitly that
W = q + Sx+ f (1  x)  1
2
2S  
1
2
2L   k
Z jx sj
0
ydy: (8)
For analytical convenience, we decompose social welfare in net global production
(	1 = q + Sx + L(1   x)   122S   122L) and total mobility cost ( 	2 = k
R jx sj
0
ydy).
Substituting the above equilibrium tax rates (6) and equilibrium public inputs (5) into
(8), we obtain
W = 	1  	2 (9)
with 	1 = q + 4
(2s2   2s+ 5) k2   36k + 8
(9k   4)2
and 	2 =
1
2
k (1  2s)2 (3k   2)
2
(9k   4)2
It is interesting to discuss how the jurisdictions’size asymmetry can affect social
welfare. First note that increased size asymmetry induces the smaller country to use
5The profit in country j is j = (q +    tj)xj , where xS = x and xL = 1  x.
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tax-dumping in a more aggressive way. Indeed, the tax differential tL   tS increases
when s decreases. Accordingly, how do the competing jurisdictions change their at-
titudes toward infrastructure expenditures? Above we show that the large country
reacts by augmenting its infrastructure supply in addition to lowering its tax rate,
while the small country reduces its infrastructure expenditures. However, in the ag-
gregate, infrastructure expenditures increase and as a result net global production
(@	1
@s
< 0) also increases. On the other hand, increasing size asymmetry exacerbates
inter-jurisdictional competition and induces more capital to move. As a result, the wel-
fare is negatively impacted ( @	2
@s
> 0). However, the sum of the two just highlighted
effects is uncertain and depends eventually on capital mobility.
When capital mobility is high ( k < k < bk , with bk = 1
9
 
2
p
7 + 8

), the positive
impact of higher size asymmetry on global net production exceeds the negative effect
of higher capital mobility. Consequently, the social welfare increases (@W
@s
< 0).
If capital mobility is low (k > bk), the opposite effect occurs (@W
@s
> 0). In this case,
capital is relatively captive and inter-jurisdictional competition is weak. It follows that
the incentive to invest in infrastructure is low, and the effect on net world productivity
is moderate. Because the unit cost of moving capital is high, the cost effect dominates
the productivity effect and social welfare decreases. This result is consistent with the
standard tax competition literature (see, for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993), but it
has no general validity6.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 1 Inter-jurisdictional competition in taxes and infrastructure yields the follow-
ing results:
(a) social welfare decreases with size asymmetry, if the degree of international openness is
low, k > bk;
6Our model reproduces the classical result if the jurisdictions are only uneven in size and only com-
pete in taxes. The reason is that size asymmetry exacerbates capital mobility without overall output
creation.
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(b) social welfare increases with size asymmetry, if the degree of international openness is
high, 2
3
< k < bk;
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that size disparity among competing economies has an ambiguous
effect on overall social welfare when countries not only compete in taxes but also in in-
frastructures. The reason is that increasing size disparity impacts the intensity of inter-
jurisdictional competition and thus influences the mix of policy instruments that are
used to attract mobile capital. Basically, increased size asymmetry makes the smaller
country more aggressive in undercutting its rival, and consequently, more firms will
relocate their businesses. In standard tax competition models, relocation is uniquely
wasteful as long as it does not induce (or is accompanied by) additional output cre-
ation.
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